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Abstract
This paper deals with asymmetric decision problems. We describe a generalization of the valuation network rep-
resentation and solution technique to enable ecient representation and solution of asymmetric decision problems. The
generalization includes the concepts of indicator valuations and eective frames. We illustrate our technique by solving
Howard's used car buyer's problem in complete detail. We highlight the contribution of this paper over the symmetric
valuation network technique. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with asymmetric decision
problems. An asymmetric decision problem can be
de®ned using its decision tree representation. In a
decision tree, a path from the root node to a leaf
node is called a scenario. We say a decision prob-
lem is asymmetric if the number of scenarios in a
decision tree representation is less than the cardi-
nality of the Cartesian product of the state spaces
of all chance and decision variables. In asymmetric
decision problems, some scenarios may exclude
either some chance variables, or some decision
variables, or both.
A decision problem can be represented formally
in several dierent ways. A traditional represen-
tation of a decision problem is a decision tree
model. Decision trees have their genesis in the
extensive-form game representation de®ned by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Decision
trees graphically depict all possible scenarios. The
sequence of variables in each scenario represents
information constraints. The decision tree solution
technique computes an optimal strategy using lo-
cal computation, namely the backward recursion
method of dynamic programming (Raia and
Schlaifer, 1961).
A major disadvantage of the decision tree
representation technique is the combinatorial
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explosion of the number of scenarios. Recently,
Kirkwood (1993) has described an algebraic rep-
resentation technique that addresses this problem.
Another major disadvantage of the decision tree
representation technique is the computation of the
conditional probabilities it demands. A problem
statement may describe a probability model for
chance variables using one set of conditionals, but
the decision tree representation may demand a
dierent set of conditionals. The decision tree
representation technique does not include an e-
cient method for computing the necessary condi-
tionals. A brute-force computation of the
conditionals by computing the joint may be in-
tractable in problems that have many chance
variables. Recently, Shenoy (1998) has proposed
using information sets in a decision tree represen-
tation to allow the resulting representation ± called
a game tree representation ± to always use the
conditionals speci®ed in the problem statement,
i.e., no preprocessing is required to represent any
decision problem as a game tree.
Another traditional representation is a strategy
matrix model. Strategy matrices have their genesis
in the normal form game representation de®ned by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). In a
strategy matrix model, along one-dimension we list
strategies, along the other dimension we list con-
®gurations of all chance variables with their re-
spective probabilities, and for each strategy±
con®guration pair, we list a utility value. Solving a
strategy matrix model is straightforward. We
simply compute the expected utility for each
strategy, and then identify an optimal strategy.
Notice that the strategy matrix representation and
solution technique is computationally less ecient
than decision tree technique. The strategy matrix
technique uses global computation both for the
computation of the joint probability distribution
and for the identi®cation of an optimal strategy,
whereas the decision tree technique uses local
computation for the latter.
A more recent representation is an in¯uence
diagram model. In¯uence diagrams were initially
proposed as a front-end for decision trees (Miller
III et al., 1976; Howard and Matheson, 1981). A
motivation behind the formulation of in¯uence
diagram representation was to ®nd a method for
representing decision problems without any pre-
processing. Subsequently, Olmsted (1983) and
Shachter (1986) devised a method for solving in-
¯uence diagrams directly, i.e., without ®rst having
to convert in¯uence diagrams to decision trees.
The in¯uence diagram solution technique ± called
arc-reversal ± uses local computation both for the
computation of the conditionals and for the
computation of an optimal strategy.
A most recent representation is a valuation
network model (Shenoy, 1992a, 1993). Valuation
networks are similar to in¯uence diagrams
in many ways. However, there are two main
dierences. First, unlike in¯uence diagrams, val-
uation networks do not demand probabilities in
the form of conditionals. Any probability model
can be represented in the form of probability
valuations. Second, the valuation network solu-
tion technique ± called the fusion algorithm ± is
slightly more ecient than the arc-reversal tech-
nique of in¯uence diagrams since it avoids un-
necessary divisions (Shenoy, 1994b). Recently,
Ndilikilikesha (1992, 1994) has translated the
fusion algorithm into the in¯uence diagram
framework.
Both in¯uence diagrams and valuation net-
works as originally conceived were designed for
symmetric decision problems. For asymmetric
decision problems, these techniques make an
asymmetric problem symmetric by adding vari-
ables and dummy con®gurations to scenarios. In
doing so, we increase the computational burden of
solving the problem. For this reason, representing
and solving asymmetric problems has been the
subject of several studies in recent years.
In the in¯uence diagram literature, four tech-
niques have been proposed by Call and Miller
(1990), Smith et al. (1993), Fung and Shachter
(1990), and Covaliu and Oliver (1995), to deal with
asymmetric decision problems. Each of these four
techniques is a hybrid of in¯uence diagram and
decision tree techniques. In essence, in¯uence di-
agram representation is used to capture the un-
certainty information, and decision tree
representation is used to capture the structural
asymmetry information.
In this paper, we investigate the use of valua-
tion networks to represent and solve asymmetric
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decision problems. The structural asymmetry in-
formation is represented by indicator valuations.
An indicator valuation is a special type of a
probability valuation whose values are restricted
to either 0 or 1. Indicator valuations contribute to
the computational eciency in three important
ways. First, indicator valuations enable us to re-
duce the domain of probability valuations. Thus
the probability information is broken down into
smaller chunks. This means that the fusion algo-
rithm (which uses local computation) operates
more locally, and this contributes greatly to im-
proving the computational eciency in solving
problems. Second, we use indicator valuations to
de®ne eective frames as subsets of frames of
variables. All numeric information is speci®ed only
for eective frames. The solution technique is
mostly the same as in the symmetric case. The
main dierence is that all computations are done
on the smaller space of eective frames instead of
on the larger space of frames. This contributes to
the increased eciency of the solution technique.
Third, when restricted to eective frames, the
values of indicator valuations are identically one,
and therefore indicator valuations can be handled
implicitly and this contributes further to the in-
creased eciency of the solution technique.
We compare the technique proposed here with
the symmetric valuation network technique pro-
posed earlier (Shenoy, 1992a). This helps to high-
light the added contribution of this paper. Bielza
and Shenoy (1996) compare the asymmetric valu-
ation network technique with the in¯uence dia-
gram-based technique of Smith et al. (1993) and
the sequential decision diagram technique of
Covaliu and Oliver (1995).
An outline of the remainder of the paper is as
follows. In Section 2, we give a verbal statement of
the used car buyer's problem (Howard, 1962). This
is a highly asymmetric decision problem. In Sec-
tion 3, we describe the valuation network repre-
sentation method for asymmetric decision
problems and illustrate it using the used car buy-
er's problem. In Section 4, we describe what it
means for a valuation network representation to
be well-de®ned, and what it means to solve a well-
de®ned valuation network representation. In Sec-
tion 5, we describe a fusion algorithm for solving
well-de®ned valuation network representations.
The fusion algorithm described here is an adap-
tation of the fusion algorithm for symmetric val-
uation network representations (Shenoy, 1992a).
In Section 6, we compare our method to the
symmetric valuation network technique (Shenoy,
1992a). Finally, in Section 7, we summarize and
conclude with a brief statement of further research
on this topic.
2. The used car buyer's problem
In this section, we give a complete statement of
the used car buyer's (UCB) problem (Howard,
1962). This problem is highly asymmetric. Howard
(1962) describes a decision tree representation and
solution of this problem. Smith et al. (1993) des-
cribe a representation and solution of this problem
based on a generalization of the symmetric in¯u-
ence diagram technique (Howard and Matheson,
1981; Olmsted, 1983; Shachter, 1986; Ezawa, 1986;
Tatman, 1986).
A statement of the UCB problem is as follows.
Joe is considering buying a used car from a dealer
for $1000. The market price of similar cars with no
defects is $1100. Joe is uncertain whether the
particular car he is considering is a ``peach'' or a
``lemon''. Of the 10 major subsystems in the car, a
peach has a serious defect in only one subsystem,
whereas a lemon has a serious defect in six sub-
systems. The probability that the used car under
consideration is a lemon is 0.2. The cost of re-
pairing one defect is $40, and the cost of repairing
six defects is $200.
For an additional $60, Joe can buy the car from
the dealer with an ``anti-lemon guarantee''. The
anti-lemon guarantee will normally pay for 50% of
the repair cost, but if the car is a lemon, then the
guarantee will pay 100% of the repair cost.
Before buying the car, Joe has the option of
having the car examined by a mechanic for an
hour. In this time period, the mechanic oers three
alternatives, t1, t2, and t3 as follows:
t1: Test the steering subsystem alone at a cost of
$9;
t2: Test the fuel and electrical subsystems for a
total cost of $13;
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t3: Do a two-test sequence in which Joe can au-
thorize a second test after the result of the ®rst
test is known. In this alternative, the mechanic
will ®rst test the transmission subsystem at a
cost of $10 and report the results to Joe. If
Joe approves, the mechanic will then proceed
to test the dierential subsystem at an addition-
al cost of $4.
All tests are guaranteed to ®nd a defect in the
subsystems if a defect exists. We assume that Joe's
utility for pro®t is linear in dollars.
A decision tree representation and solution of
this problem is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1
shows the preprocessing of probabilities, and
Fig. 2 shows a decision tree representation and
solution. The optimal strategy is to do test t2; if
both systems are non-defective then buy with no
guarantee, else buy with guarantee. The maximum
expected utility is $32.87.
3. Valuation network representation
In this section, we describe the valuation net-
work representation technique and illustrate it
using the UCB problem. The representation tech-
nique described here is a generalization of the
valuation network representation technique de-
scribed in Shenoy (1992a, 1993) for symmetric
decision problems. To deal with asymmetries in
decision problems, we introduce the concepts of
indicator valuations and eective frames. An in-
dicator valuation is a special type of a probability
valuation, and an eective frame is a subset of a
frame.
A valuation network representation is speci-
®ed at three levels ± graphical, dependence, and
numeric. This is somewhat analogous to Howard
and Matheson's (1981) relational, functional, and
numerical levels of speci®cation in in¯uence
diagrams. The graphical and dependence levels
have qualitative (or symbolic) knowledge,
whereas the numeric level has quantitative
knowledge.
3.1. Graphical level
At the graphical level, a valuation network
representation consists of a graph called a valua-
Fig. 1. The preprocessing of probabilities in the UCB problem.
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Fig. 2. A decision tree representation and solution of the UCB problem.
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tion network. Fig. 3 shows a valuation network
for the UCB problem. A valuation network
consists of two types of nodes ± variable and
valuation. Variables are further classi®ed as either
decision or chance, and valuations are further
classi®ed as either indicator, or probability, or
utility. Thus in a valuation network, there are ®ve
dierent types of nodes-decision, chance, indica-
tor, probability, and utility. Using knowledge-
based systems terminology, the collection of
decision and chance variables constitute a de-
scription of the problem at the propositional
level, and the collection of indicator, probability,
and utility valuations constitute a description of
the problem at the knowledge level.
Decision nodes: Decision nodes correspond to
decision variables and are depicted by rectangles.
In the UCB problem, there are three decision
nodes labeled T1, T2, and B. T1 represents the
®rst test decision, T2 represents the second test
decision, and B represents the buy car decision.
The values of the decision variables (i.e., the al-
ternatives) are not shown in the valuation net-
work. The set of values of a variable is called the
frame for that variable. The frames of decision
variables are speci®ed at the dependence level
description of the valuation network representa-
tion (in Section 3.2).
Chance nodes: Chance nodes correspond to
chance variables and are depicted by circles. In the
UCB problem, there are three chance nodes la-
beled R1, R2, and S. R1 represents the ®rst test
results, R2 represents the second test results, and S
represents the state of the car. As in the case of
decision variables, the values of chance variables
are not shown in the valuation network. The
frames of chance variables are speci®ed in the de-
pendence level description of the valuation net-
work representation (in Section 3.2).
Let XD denote the set of all decision variables,
let XR denote the set of all chance variables, and let
X  XD [XR denote the set of all variables. In this
paper we are concerned only with the case where X
is ®nite. We use upper-case italic alphabets to de-
note variables.
Indicator valuations: Indicator valuations rep-
resent qualitative constraints on the joint frames of
decision and chance variables and are depicted by
double-triangular nodes. The set of variables di-
rectly connected to an indicator valuation by un-
directed edges constitutes the domain of the
indicator valuation. In the UCB problem, there
are two indicator valuations labeled i1 and i2. i1's
domain is fT1;R1g, and i2's domain is fT1; T2;R2g.
i1 represents the constraint that ®rst test result is
not available if Joe decides not to do any of three
tests proposed by the mechanic at T1. i2 represents
the constraints that at T2, the option to stop or
continue is available only if Joe decides on test t3
proposed by the mechanic at T1, and that the
second test result is available only if Joe decides on
test t2 at T1, or if he decides on test t3 at T1 and
decides to continue at T2. The details of the indi-
cator valuations are speci®ed at the dependence
level description of the valuation network repre-
sentation (in Section 3.2).
Fig. 3. A valuation network for the UCB problem.
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Utility valuations: Utility valuations represent
factors of the joint utility function and are depic-
ted by diamond-shaped nodes in valuation net-
works. The set of variables directly connected to a
utility valuation constitutes the domain of the
utility valuation. Depending on whether the utility
function decomposes additively or multiplicative-
ly, the factors are additive or multiplicative (or
perhaps some combination of the two). In the
UCB problem, there are three additive utility val-
uations labeled t1, t2, and t3. t1's domain is {T1},
t2's domain is {T2}, and t3's domain is fB; Sg. t1
represents the cost of the ®rst test, t2 represents the
cost of the second test, and t3 represents the value
of the car less the cost of buying the car and re-
pairing the defects. The details of the utility valu-
ations are speci®ed at the numeric level description
of the valuation network representation (in Sec-
tion 3.3).
Probability valuations: Probability valuations
represent multiplicative factors of the family of
joint probability distributions of the chance
variables in the problem, and are depicted by
triangular nodes in valuation networks. The set of
all variables directly connected to a probability
valuation constitutes the domain of the proba-
bility valuation. If a probability valuation is a
conditional, then this is indicated by making the
edges between the probability valuation node and
the variables in the head of the conditional di-
rected toward the variables. In the UCB problem,
there are three probability valuations labeled r,
q1, and q2. r's domain is {S}, q1's domain is
fR1; Sg, and q2's domain is fR1;R2; Sg. The arrow
from r to S indicates that r is a conditional for
{S} given ;. The details of the probability valu-
ations are speci®ed at the numeric level descrip-
tion of the valuation network representation (in
Section 3.3). The precise meaning of the proba-
bility valuations is given in Section 3.3 and
Section 4.2.
Information constraints: The speci®cation of the
valuation network at the graphical level includes
directed arcs between pairs of distinct variables.
These directed arcs represent information con-
straints. Suppose R is a chance variable and sup-
pose D is a decision variable. An arc R ® D
means that the true value of R is known to the
decision maker (DM) when the DM chooses an
alternative from D's frame, and an arc from
D ® R means that the true value of R is not
known to the DM at the time the DM has to
choose an alternative from D's frame.
Well-de®ned information constraints: We say
the information constraints are well-de®ned if they
satisfy the following condition: For any chance
variable R and for any decision variable D, either
there is a directed path from R to D, or there is a
directed path from D to R, but not both. (We say
there is a directed path from X to Y if either
X ® Y or there exists Z1; . . . ; Zk for some
k P 1 such that X ! Z1; Z1 ! Z2; . . . ; Zkÿ1 ! Zk;
Zk ! Y .)
The rationale behind the de®nition of well-de-
®ned information constraints is as follows. The
information constraints are used during the solu-
tion phase to solve the valuation network repre-
sentation. The information constraints dictate
what deletion sequences are valid for deleting
variables during the solution phase. If there is a
directed path from D to R, then R must be deleted
before D, and if there is a directed path from R to
D, then D must be deleted before R. If there is
neither a directed path from D to R nor a directed
path from R to D, then depending on whether R is
deleted before D or not, we may get dierent so-
lutions to the decision problem. On the other
hand, if there is a directed path from D to R and a
directed path from R to D, then there does not
exist a valid deletion sequence, and we are unable
to solve the problem.
We assume that the DM has perfect recall. This
means that if there is a directed path from R to D,
then the DM knows the true value of R at the time
the DM has to choose an alternative from D's
frame, and if there is a directed path from D to R,
then this means that the DM does not know the
true value of R at the time the DM has to choose
an alternative from D's frame. In the UCB prob-
lem, for example, at the time Joe makes a buy
decision, he knows the results of the ®rst test and
the second test, but not the state of the car. If the
information constraints are well-de®ned, then
given any chance variable R and any decision
variable D, either the DM knows the true value of
R (at the time the DM has to choose an alternative
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from D's frame) or not. If the information con-
straints are not well-de®ned, then this means that
either the information constraints are incompletely
speci®ed or that the information constraints are
contradictory.
3.2. Dependence level
Next, we specify valuation network represen-
tation at the dependence level. Like the graphical
level, speci®cation of a valuation network repre-
sentation at the dependence level involves only
qualitative (or symbolic) knowledge. In this sense,
the dependence level of a valuation network rep-
resentation is dierent from the function level of
in¯uence diagram representation since the latter
may involve arithmetic operations.
Frames: Associated with each variable X is a
frame WX We assume that all variables have ®nite
frames. The frame of a decision variable consists
of alternatives available to the DM. The frame of a
chance variable consists of all mutually exclusive
and exhaustive values that the chance variable can
assume. We use the terminology ``frame'' (as op-
posed to ``sample space'') to emphasize the fact
that the possibilities that comprise a frame are
neither determined nor meaningful independent of
our knowledge (Shafer, 1976, p. 36).
In the UCB problem, WT1  fnt; t1; t2; t3g,
where nt denotes no test, and ti denotes the ith test
option oered by the mechanic, i 1, 2, and 3;
WR1  fn1; d1; d1g, where n1 denotes no result,
d1 denotes the ®rst subsystem tested is defective,
and  d1 denotes the ®rst subsystem tested is non-
defective; WT2  fnc; s; cg, where nc denotes no
choice, s denotes stop, and c denotes continue;
WR2  n2; d2; d2, where n2 denotes no result, d2
denotes the second subsystem tested is defective,
and  d2 denotes the second subsystem tested is
non-defective; WB  fb; g; bg, where b denotes
buy with no guarantee, g denotes buy with guar-
antee, and  b denotes do not buy; and WS 
fp; lg where p denotes the car is a peach, and l
denotes the car is a lemon.
Con®gurations: We often deal with non-empty
subsets of variables in X. Given a non-empty
subset h of X, let Wh denote the Cartesian product
of WX for X in h, i.e., Wh fWX jX 2 hg. We
can think of Wh as the set of possible values of the
joint variable h. Accordingly, we call Wh the frame
for h. Also, we refer to elements of Wh as con®g-
urations of h. We use this terminology even when h
consists of a single variable, say X. Thus we refer
to elements of WX as con®gurations of X. We use
lower-case, bold-faced letters such as x, y, etc., to
denote con®gurations. Also, if x is a con®guration
of g, y is a con®guration of h, and g \ h  ;, then
x; y denotes a con®guration of g [ h.
It is convenient to extend this terminology to
the case where the set of variables h is empty. We
adopt the convention that the frame for the empty
set ; consists of a single con®guration, and we use
the symbol r to name that con®guration;
W;  frg. To be consistent with our notation
above, we adopt the convention that if x is a
con®guration, then x;r  x.
Indicator valuations: Earlier we described indi-
cator valuations as qualitative constraints on the
joint frames of variables. Here, we de®ne them
formally. Suppose s is a subset of variables. An
indicator valuation for s is a function i: Ws ! f0; 1g.
The only values assumed by an indicator valuation
are 0 and 1, hence the term indicator valuation.
The values of indicator valuations can be treated
as (degenerate) probabilities. An ecient way of
representing an indicator valuation is simply to
describe the elements of the frame that have value
1, i.e., we represent i by Xi where Xi 
fx 2Wsjix  1g. Obviously, Xi Ws. To min-
imize jargon, we also call Xi an indicator valuation
for s.
In the UCB problem, we have two indicator
valuations ± i1 (or Xi1 ) with domainfT1;R1g, and i2
(or Xi2 ) with domain fT1; T2;R2g. These indicator
valuations are speci®ed as follows:
Xi1  fnt; n1; t1; d1; t1; d1; t2; d1;
t2; d1; t3; d1; t3; d1g;
and
Xi2  fnt; nc; n2; t1; nc; n2; t2; nc; d2;
t2; nc; d2; t3; s; n2; t3; c; d2;
t3; c; d2g:
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i1 represents the constraint that the ®rst test result
is not available if Joe decides not to do any of the
three tests proposed by the mechanic at T1. i2
represents the constraints that at T2, the option to
stop or continue is available only if Joe decides on
test t3 proposed by the mechanic at T1, and that
the second test result is available only if Joe de-
cides on test t2 at T1, or if he decides on test t3 at
T1 and decides to continue at T2. Fig. 4 depicts the
two indicator valuations graphically.
Some indicator valuations constrain domains
of chance variables. For example, i1 constrains the
domain of R1. Some indicator valuations constrain
domains of decision variable and some indicator
valuations constrain the domains of both decision
and chance variables. For example i2 constrains
the domains of T2 and R2.
The concept of indicator valuations is crucial to
the computational eciency of the solution tech-
nique. Using the indicator valuations in a problem,
we de®ne the ``eective frame'' for a subset of
variables. The eective frame for s is a subset of
the frame for s. The increased computational e-
ciency of the solution technique is partly the result
of working on eective frames instead of working
on frames. In the remainder of this subsection, we
introduce some notation and de®nitions to enable
us to de®ne the eective frame for a subset of
variables.
Projection of con®gurations: Projection of con-
®gurations simply means dropping extra coordi-
nates; if t3; d1; c; d2 is a con®guration of
fT1;R1; T2;R2g, for example, then the projection of
t3; d1; c; d2 to fT1;R1g is simply t3; d1, which is
a con®guration of fT1;R1g.
If g and h are sets of variables, h  g, and x is a
con®guration of g, then let x#h denote the projec-
tion of x to h. The projection x#h is always a
con®guration of h. If h g and x is a con®guration
of g, then x#h x. If h;, then x#h  r.
Marginalization of indicator valuations: Sup-
pose Xia is an indicator valuation for a, and
suppose b  a. The marginalization of Xia to b,
denoted by X#bia , is an indicator valuation for b
given by
X#bia  fx 2Wbjx; y 2 Xia for some y 2Waÿbg:
To illustrate this de®nition, consider the indi-
cator valuation Xi2 for fT1; T2;R2g in the UCB
Fig. 4. A graphical depiction of Xi1 and Xi2 .
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problem. The marginal of Xi2 for fT1; T2g is given
by the indicator valuation
X#fT1;T2gi2  fnt; nc; t1; nc; t2; nc; t3; s; t3; cg:
Combination of indicator valuations: Suppose
Xia is an indicator valuation for a, and suppose Xib
is an indicator valuation for b. The combination of
Xia and Xib , denoted by Xia 
 Xib , is an indicator
valuation for a [ b given by
Xia 
 Xib  fx 2Wa[bjx#a 2 Xia and x#b 2 Xibg:
To illustrate this de®nition, consider the two
indicator valuations Xi1 and Xi2 in the UCB prob-
lem. The combination Xi1 
 Xi2 is an indicator
valuation for fT1;R1; T2;R2g given as follows:
Xi1 
 Xi2
 fnt; n1; nc; n2; t1; d1; nc; n2;
t1; d1; nc; n2; t2; d1; nc; d2; t2; d1; nc; d2;
t2; d1; nc; d2; t2; d1; nc; d2;
t3; d1; s; n2; t3; d1; c; d2; t3; d1; c; d2;
t3; d1; s; n2; t3; d1; c; d2;
t3; d1; c; d2g:
Eective frames: Suppose fXi1 ; . . . ;Xipg is the
set of indicator valuations in a given problem such
that Xij is an indicator valuation for
sj; j  1; . . . ; p. Without loss of generality, assume
that s1 [    [ sp  X. (If a variable, say X, is not
included in the domain of some indicator valua-
tion, include the vacuous indicator valuation Xi
for {X}, i.e., Xi WX .) Suppose s is a subset of
variables. The eective frame for s, denoted by Xs,
is given by
Xs  
fXik jsk \ s 6 ;g#s:
In words, the eective frame for s is de®ned in two
steps as follows. First we combine indicator valu-
ations whose domains include a variable in s.
Second, we marginalize the resulting combination
to eliminate variables not in s.
To illustrate this de®nition, consider the indi-
cator valuations Xi1 for fT1;R1g, and Xi2 for
fT1; T2;R2g. Since B and S are not included in the
domains of the two indicator valuations, we need
to introduce vacuous indicator valuations Xi3 for B
and Xi4 for {S}. Then, for example, the eective
frame for R1;R2; S is given by
XfR1;R2;Sg  Xi1 
 Xi2 
 Xi4#fR1;R2;Sg
 fn1; n2; p; n1; n2; l; d1; n2; p;
d1; n2; l; d1; d2; p; d1; d2; l;
d1; d2; p; d1; d2; l;  d1; n2; p;
 d1; n2; l;  d1; d2; p;  d1; d2; l;
 d1; d2; p;  d1; d2; lg:
As we will see shortly, all the numeric infor-
mation in probability and utility valuations are
speci®ed on eective frames only. Also, in the so-
lution phase, all numerical computations are done
on eective frames. The de®nitions of marginal-
ization and combination of indicator valuations
allow us to de®ne eective frames in terms of in-
dicator valuations. In Section 5, we describe an
ecient method to compute eective frames using
local computation.
3.3. Numeric level
Finally, we specify a valuation network at the
numeric level. At this level, we specify the details
of the utility and probability valuations.
Utility valuations: Suppose u  X. A utility
valuation t for u is a function t: Xu ! R, where R
is the set of real numbers. The values of t are
utilities. If t is a utility valuation for u, we say u is
the domain of t.
Table 1
Utility valuations in the UCB problem
XT1 t1 XT2 t2 XfB;Sg t3
nt 0 nc 0 b p 60
t1 ÿ9 c ÿ4 b l ÿ100
t2 ÿ13 s 0 g p 20
t3 ÿ10 g l 40
b p 0
b l 0
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In the UCB problem, there are three utility
valuations t1 for {T1}, t2 for {T2}, and t3 for
fB; Sg. Table 1 shows the details of these utility
valuations.
What are the semantics of utility valuations?
Each utility valuation is a ``factor'' of the joint
utility valuation. Naturally, we need to specify
how the utility valuations combine to de®ne the
joint utility valuation. In the UCB problem, the
utility valuations combine by pointwise addition.
A formal de®nition is as follows.
Combination of utility valuations: Suppose h and
g are subsets of X, suppose ti is a utility valuation
for h, and suppose tj is a utility valuation for g.
Then the combination of ti and tj, denoted by
ti
tj, is a utility valuation for h [ g de®ned as
follows:
ti 
 tjx  tix#h  tjx#g
for all x 2 Xh[g. Thus combination of utility val-
uations is pointwise addition. This de®nition as-
sumes of course that ti and tj are additive factors
of ti
tj. (If ti and tj were multiplicative factors,
we would have de®ned combination as pointwise
multiplication.)
In the UCB problem, the joint utility function is
given by the utility valuation t1
t2
t3 for
fT1; T2;B; Sg. As we will see, it is not necessary to
compute the joint utility valuation to solve a de-
cision problem. The only reason for de®ning the
joint utility valuation is to explain what each
utility valuation represents, namely a factor of the
joint.
Probability valuations: Suppose r  X. A prob-
ability valuation q for r is a function q: Xr ! 0; 1.
The values of q are probabilities. If q is a valuation
for r, then we say r is the domain of q.
In the UCB problem, there are three probabil-
ity valuations: r for fSg; q1 for fS;R1g; and q2
for fS;R1;R2g. Table 2 shows the details of these
probability valuations.
What are the semantics of probability valua-
tions? In general, each probability valuation is a
factor of the joint probability valuation. Natural-
ly, we need to specify how the probability valua-
tions combine to de®ne the joint probability
valuation. Also, to de®ne conditionals ± a special
type of a probability valuation ± we need to de®ne
marginalization of probability valuations and di-
vision for probability valuations. After we de®ne
these terms, we will explain precisely what the
three probability valuations in the UCB problem
mean.
Combination of probability valuations: Proba-
bility theory de®nes combination as an operation
that combines probability valuations by pointwise
multiplication. A formal de®nition is as follows.
Suppose h and g are subsets of X, suppose qi is a
probability valuation for h, and suppose qj is a
probability valuation for g. Then the combination
Table 2
Probability valuations in the UCB problem
XS r XfS;R1g q1 XfS;R1 ;R2g q2
p 0.80 p n1 1 p n1 n2 1
l 0.20 p d1 1/10 p d1 n2 1
p  d1 9/10 p  d1 n2 1
l n1 1 p d1 d2 0/9
l d1 6/10 p d1  d2 9/9
l  d1 4/10 p  d1 d2 1/9
p  d1  d2 8/9
l n1 n2 1
l d1 n2 1
l  d1 n2 1
l d1 d2 5/9
l d1  d2 4/9
l  d1 d2 6/9
l  d1  d2 3/9
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of qi and qj, denoted by qi
qj or qj
qi), is a
probability valuation for h [ g such that
qi 
 qjx  qj 
 qix  qix#hqjx#g
for all x 2 Xh[g.
Marginalization of probability valuations:
Probability theory de®nes marginalization as an
operation that reduces the domain of a probability
function. Suppose h is a subset of X containing
(chance or decision) variable X, and suppose q is a
probability valuation for h. The marginal of q for
h ÿ {X}, denoted by q#h ÿ fXg, is a probability
valuation for h ÿ {X} such that
q#hÿX c  Rfqc; xjx 2WX 3 c; x 2 Xhg
for all c 2 XhÿfXg.
Suppose q is a probability valuation for r. We
say q is a probability distribution for r if and only if
q#;r  1, i.e., if the values of q sum to 1.
Division: Finally, probability theory de®nes a
division operation (for de®ning conditionals).
Suppose a is a probability valuation for g, and
suppose h  g. Then we de®ne a=a#h, called a di-
vided by a#h, to be a probability valuation for g
de®ned as follows:
a=a#hr  ar=a#hr#h
for all r 2 Xg. If ar  a#hr#h  0, then we
consider a=a#hr  0. In all other respects, the
division in the right-hand side of the de®nition
above should be interpreted as the usual division
of two real numbers. Since a#hr#hP arP 0
for all r 2 Xg, the values of a/a#h lie in the interval
[0, 1].
Conditionals: Suppose a is a probability dis-
tribution for a [ b, where a and b are disjoint
subsets of variables. We call v  a=a#b a condi-
tional for a given b. We call a the head of (the
domain of) v, and we call b the tail of v. Suppose
v  a=a#b is a conditional for a given b. Then it is
easy to see that v#b is an identity for a, i.e.,
a
 v#b  a. Also, it is easy to see that v=v#b  v.
We will exploit these properties of conditionals to
avoid unnecessary division operations in the fu-
sion algorithm. If a probability valuation is a
conditional by itself, then this is speci®ed in the
valuation network by directing the edges between
a conditional and its head toward the head. In the
UCB problem, for example, r is a conditional for
{S} given ;.
Combination of an indicator and a probability
valuation: Suppose h and g are subsets of X,
suppose i is an indicator valuation for h, and
suppose q is a probability valuation for g. Then
the combination of i and q, denoted by i
q or
q
i, is a probability valuation for h [ g de®ned
as follows:
i
 qx  q
 ix  qx#g
for all x 2 Xh[g. In combining an indicator valua-
tion and a probability valuation, there is no
computation involved since the values of an indi-
cator valuation are identically one over the eec-
tive frame. However, indicator valuations do
contribute domain information to the combina-
tion, i.e., the domain of i
q is h [ g whereas the
domain of q is g.
Semantics of probability valuations in the UCB
problem: In the UCB problem, the probability
valuation r for {S} is the marginal for S. The
probability valuation q1
i1 for fT1;R1; Sg is a
conditional for {R1} givenfS; T1g(see Table 3).
The values of this conditional are speci®ed im-
plicitly in the statement of the problem. The con-
ditional for {R1} given fS; T1g factors into q1 and
i1. q1 contains the numeric information of this
conditional, and i1 contains the structural infor-
mation of this conditional. q1 can be given precise
semantics as follows. For x 2 XfR1;Sg; q1x repre-
sents the conditional probability of x#R1 given x#S
and the fact that x is not ruled out by structural
constraints. For example, q1p; n1  1 because
since no result (n1) is not ruled out by structural
constraints, and it is the only value of R1 possible
in this circumstance, its conditional probability
must be 1.
The probability valuation q2
i2 for
fT1;R1; T2;R2; Sg is a conditional for {R2} given
fS; T1;R1; T2g (see Table 3). The values of this
conditional are speci®ed implicitly in the problem
statement. As in the previous case, this conditional
factors into q2 and i2. Also, using the same argu-
ment as in the case of r, q2(x) represents the
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conditional probability of x#R2 given x#fS;R1g and
the fact that x#R2 is not ruled out by structural
constraints.
Summary: We have now completely de®ned a
valuation network representation of a decision
problem. In summary, a valuation network rep-
resentation of a decision problem D consists of
decision variables, chance variables, indicator
valuations, probability valuations, utility valua-
tions, and information constraints,
D  XD;XR; fi1; . . . ; ipg; ft1; . . . ; tmg; fq1; . . . ; qng;

! 	:
In the next section, we describe the meaning and
solution of a valuation network representation.
4. Semantics and solution of a valuation network
representation
The main goal of this section is to explain the
meaning of utility valuations, indicator valuations,
and probability valuations. This will enable us to
de®ne when a valuation network representation is
well-de®ned, and what it means to solve a well-
de®ned valuation network representation. Al-
though most of this material is stated in Shenoy
(1992a), there are two points of departure. First we
need to account for indicator valuations. Second,
the de®nition of a well-de®ned valuation network
representation stated here is weaker than the cor-
responding de®nition in Shenoy (1992a). This has
an important implication in the solution tech-
nique.
This section is organized into two subsections.
In Section 4.1, we de®ne the concept of a canonical
valuation network. In Section 4.2, we use the
concept of a canonical valuation network to de®ne
what it means for a valuation network represen-
tation to be well-de®ned and to de®ne what it
means to solve a valuation network representation.
4.1. A canonical valuation network representation
A canonical valuation network DC  ffDg; fRg;
ftg; fqg;!g consists of a decision variable D with
Table 3
The conditionals in the UCB problem
XfS;T1 ;R1g q1 
 i1 XfS;T1 ;R1 ;T2 ;R2g q2 
 i2
p nt n1 1 p nt n1 nc n2 1
p t1 d1 1/10 p t1 d1 nc n2 1
p t1  d1 9/10 p t1  d1 nc n2 1
p t2 d1 1/10 p t2 d1 nc n2 1
p t2  d1 9/10 p t2  d1 nc n2 1
p t3 d1 1/10 p t3 d1 c d2 0/9
p t3  d1 9/10 p t3 d1 c  d2 9/9
l nt n1 1 p t3 d1 s n2 1
l t1 d1 6/10 p t3  d1 c d2 1/9
l t1  d1 4/10 p t3  d1 c  d2 8/9
l t2 d1 6/10 p t3  d1 s n2 1
l t2  d1 4/10 l nt n1 nc n2 1
l t3 d1 6/10 l t1 d1 nc n2 1
l t3  d1 4/10 l t1  d1 nc n2 1
l t2 d1 nc n2 1
l t2  d1 nc n2 1
l t3 d1 c d2 5/9
l t3 d1 c  d2 4/9
l t3 d1 s n2 1
l t3  d1 c d2 6/9
l t3  d1 c  d2 3/9
l t3  d1 s n2 1
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a ®nite frame WD, a chance variable R with a ®nite
frame WR, a utility valuation t for {D, R}, a
conditional q for {R} given {D}, and a precedence
relation ® de®ned by D ® R. Fig. 5 shows a ca-
nonical valuation network and an equivalent de-
cision tree representation.
The meaning of the canonical valuation net-
work is as follows. The elements of WD are al-
ternatives, and the elements of WR are states of
nature. The conditional q for {R} given {D} is a
family of probability distributions for R, one for
each alternative d 2WD. In other words, the
probability distribution of chance variable R is
conditioned on the alternative d chosen by the
decision maker. The probability q(d, r) can be in-
terpreted as the conditional probability of R r
given D d. Since q is a conditional for {R} given
{D}, it follows that
q#fDgd  1 for all d 2WD: 4:1
The utility valuation t is a conditional utility
function ± if the decision maker chooses alter-
native d and the state of nature r prevails, then
the utility to the decision maker is t(d, r). The
precedence relation ® states that the true state of
nature is revealed to the decision maker only
after the decision maker has chosen an alterna-
tive.
Before we can describe how to solve a ca-
nonical decision problem, we need some de®ni-
tions. We give formal de®nitions for combining a
probability and a utility valuation, marginalizing
a chance variable out of the domain of a utility
valuation, marginalizing a decision variable out
of the domain of a utility valuation, and de®ning
a decision function associated with marginalizing
a decision variable out of the domain of a utility
valuation.
Combination of a utility and a probability valu-
ation: In the previous section, we de®ned combi-
nation of two utility valuations, and combination
of two probability valuations. Here we de®ne
combination of a utility and a probability valua-
tion, and combination of a utility and an indicator
valuation. Suppose h and g are subsets of X,
suppose t is a utility valuation for h, and suppose q
is a probability valuation for g. Then the combi-
nation of t and q, denoted by t
q(orq
t), is a
utility valuation for h [ g de®ned as follows:
t
 qx  q
 tx  tx#hqx#g 4:2
for all x 2 Xh [ g.
Combination of a utility and an indicator valua-
tion: Suppose h and g are subsets of X, suppose t is
a utility valuation for h, and suppose i is an indi-
cator valuation for g. Then the combination of t
and i, denoted by t
i (or i
t), is a utility valua-
tion for h [ g de®ned as follows:
t
 ix  i
 tx  tx#h 4:3
Fig. 5. A canonical valution network and an equivalent decision tree representation.
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for all x 2 Xh[g. In combining an indicator valua-
tion and a utility valuation, there is no computa-
tion involved (since the values of an indicator
valuation are identically one over the eective
frame). However, indicator valuations do con-
tribute domain information to the combination,
i.e., the domain of t
i is h [ g whereas the domain
of t is h.
Marginalization of utility valuations: In the
previous section, we de®ned marginalization for
probability valuation. Here we de®ne marginal-
ization for utility valuations. The de®nition of
marginalization of utility valuations depends on
the nature of the variable being deleted.
Suppose h is a subset of X containing chance
variable R, and suppose a is a utility valuation for
h. The marginal of a for hÿ{R}, denoted by




fac; rjr 2 XR 3 c; r 2 Xhg
4:4
for all c 2 XhÿfRg.
Suppose h is a subset of X containing decision
variable D, and suppose a is a utility valuation for
h. The marginal of a for hÿ{D}, denoted by
a#hÿfDg, is a utility valuation for hÿ{D} de®ned as
follows:
a#hÿfDgc MAXfac; djd 2 XD 3 c; d 2 Xhg
4:5
for all c 2 XhÿfDg.
Decision functions: Each time we marginalize a
decision variable D from a utility valuation a for h,
we implicitly determine a decision function. Sup-
pose a is a utility valuation for h, and suppose D is
a decision variable in h. A decision function for D
with respect to a is a function nD: XhÿfDg ! XD such
that nDc  d whenever a#hÿfDgc  ac; d.
Intuitively, a decision function is rule for se-
lecting an alternative d from the frame of D on the
basis of the information c about chance and de-
cisions variables in hÿ{D}.
A decision function nD: XhÿfDg ! XD can be
encoded as an indicator valuation fD for h as
follows:
fDc; d  1 if nDc  d0 otherwise

4:6
for all c; d 2 Xh. We also call indicator valuation
fD a decision function for D with respect to a.
Strategy: A strategy r is a collection of decision
functions, one for each decision variable in XD,
i.e., r  fnDgD2XÿD. In the canonical valuation
network, since there is only one decision variable,
a strategy is simply one decision function. Also,
since the true value of R is not known when
decision D is made, a decision function for D,
nD: X; ! XD, is simply a con®guration d 
nDr in XD.
Suppose r  fnDgD2XD is a strategy, and sup-
pose y is a con®guration of XR. Then r and y to-
gether determine a unique con®guration of XD.
Let ar;y denote this unique con®guration of XD. By
de®nition, a#fDgr;y  nDy#hÿfDg, where h is the do-
main of the valuation a with respect to which nD is
de®ned.
Valid deletion sequences: Suppose ® is a binary
relation on X representing well-de®ned informa-
tion constraints. Suppose g  fX1; . . . ;Xkg is a
subset of X. We call X1 a minimal variable of g if
there does not exist Xj 2 g such that X1 ® Xj. We
call X1X2 . . . Xk a valid deletion sequence of vari-
ables in g if and only if X1 is a minimal variable in
g, X2 is a minimal variable in g ÿ fX1g; . . . ; and
Xkÿ1 is a minimal variable in g ÿ fX1; . . . ;Xkÿ2g.
Marginalizing a subset of variables from utility
valuations: Suppose h and g are non-empty subsets
of X such that g is a proper subset of h, suppose a
is a utility valuation for h, and suppose ® is a
binary relation on X representing well-de®ned in-
formation constraints. The marginal of a for g with
respect to the binary relation !, denoted by a#g, is
a valuation for g de®ned as follows:
a#g  a#hÿfX 1gÿ #hÿfX 1;X 2g  . . . #hÿfX 1;X 2;...;Xkg;
4:7
where hÿ g  fX1; . . . ;Xkg; and X1X2 . . . Xk is a
valid deletion sequence of variables in h ÿ g.
Solving a canonical valuation network: Solving
a canonical valuation network using the criteri-
on of maximizing expected utility is easy. Infor-
mally, ®rst, we combine q and t by pointwise
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multiplication. The result is a utility valuation q
t
for fD;Rg. Next we marginalize R out of q
t
using addition. The result is a utility valuation
q
 t#fDg for D. Each value q
 t#fDgd repre-
sents expected utility if alternative d is chosen by
the DM. Next, we marginalize D out of q
 t#fDg
using maximization. The result is a utility valua-
tion q
 t#fDg#; for ;. The value q

t#fDg#;r is the maximum expected utility, and
an optimal alternative is d 2WD such that
q
 t#fDgd  q
 t#fDg#;r.
Notice that we marginalize R before D. This is a
consequence of the precedence relation D ® R. If
the DM had perfect information, then this would
be represented in the canonical valuation network
by the precedence relation R ® D, and in this
case, we would marginalize D before R, and the
maximum expected utility is q
 t#fRg#;r.
The dierence q
 t#fRg#;r ÿ q
 t#fDg#;
r is called the expected value of perfect infor-
mation.
In summary, the maximum expected utility as-
sociated with an optimal alternative is
q
 t#;r, and alternative d is optimal if and
only if q
 t#fDgd  q
 t#;r.
4.2. Well-de®ned valuation network representations
Consider a valuation network representation of
a decision problem, D  fXD;XR; fi1; . . . ; ipg;
ft1; . . . ; tmg; fq1; . . . ; qng;!g. We explain the
meaning of D by reducing it to an equivalent ca-
nonical valuation network
DC  ffDg; fRg; ftg; fqg;!g:
To de®ne DC, we need to de®ne WD, WR, t, and
q. De®ne WD such that for each distinct strategy r
of D, there is a corresponding alternative dr in WD.
De®ne WR such that for each distinct con®gura-
tion y 2 XXR in D, there is a corresponding con-
®guration ry in WR.
Before we de®ne utility valuation t for fD;Rg,
we need some notation. Consider the joint utility
valuation t1 
    
 tm in D. For convenience of
exposition, suppose that the domain of this utility
valuation includes all of XD (if not, we can always
vacuously extend it so it does). Typically the
domain of this valuation also includes some (or
all) chance variables. Let v denote the subset of
chance variables included in the domain of the
joint utility valuation, i.e., v  XR such that t1 

   
 tm is a utility valuation for XD [ v. De®ne
utility valuation t for fD;Rg such that
tdr; ry  t1 
    
 tmar;y; y#v 4:8
for all strategy r of D, and for all con®guration y 2
XXR : Remember that ar;y is the unique con®gura-
tion of XD determined by r and y (see Section 4.1).
Well-de®ned probability valuations: Consider
the joint probability valuation i1 




   
 qn. For convenience of exposition, suppose
that the domain of this probability valuation in-
cludes all of XR (if not, we can always vacuously
extend it so it does). Let q denote the subset of
decision variables included in the domain of the
joint probability valuation, i.e., q  XD such that
i1 
    
 ip 
 q1 
    
 qn is a probability valua-
tion for q [XR. Note that q could be empty. De-
®ne probability valuation q for fD;Rg such that
qdr; ry  i1 
    
 ip 
 q1 
    
 qna#qr;y; y
4:9
for all strategies r, and for all con®gurations y 2
XXR : q is a conditional if it satis®es condition (4.1).
This motivates the following de®nition. We say
fi1; . . . ; ip; q1; . . . ; qng is well-de®ned in D if and
only ifX
fi1 
    
 ip 
 q1 
    
 qna#qr;y; yjy 2 XXRg
 1 4:10
for each strategy r.
In general, checking whether or not a set of
indicator and probability valuations are well de-
®ned is computationally intensive since we need to
verify Eq. (4.10) for each strategy r, and there are
an exponential number of strategies. This is the
case in the UCB problem, in which we have 63
distinct strategies. However, if a decision problem
is in Howard canonical form (Howard, 1990), i.e.,
none of the indicator valuations or probability
valuations include a decision variable in their do-
mains (i.e., q;), then (4.10) reduces to simply
checking whether i1 
    
 ip 
 q1 
    
 qn is a
probability distribution, and there are ecient
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methods that employ local computation to do this
(e.g. Shenoy, 1992b).
Well-de®ned valuation network representation:
Suppose
D  fXD;XR; fi1; . . . ; ipg; ft1; . . . ; tmg;
fq1; . . . ; qng;!g
is a decision problem. We say D is well-de®ned if
and only if fi1; . . . ; ip; q1; . . . ; qng is well-de®ned,
and ® is well-de®ned (see Section 3.1 for what it
means for ® to be well-de®ned).
In summary, in a valuation network represen-
tation D of a decision problem, the utility valua-
tions ft1; . . . ; tmg represent the factors of a joint
utility function t, and the indicator and probabil-
ity valuations fi1; . . . ; ip; q1; . . . ; qng represent the
factors of a family of joint probability distribu-
tions q.
Solving a decision problem: Suppose D 
fXD;XR; fi1; . . . ; ipg; ft1; . . . ; tmg; fq1; . . . ; qng;!g
is a well-de®ned valuation network representation
of a decision problem. Let DC  ffDg; fRg; ftg;
fqg;!g denote the equivalent canonical valuation
network representation. In the canonical valuation
network DC, the two computations that are of in-
terest are (1) the computation of the maximum
expected value q
 t#;r; and (2) the computa-
tion of an optimal alternative dr such that
q
 t#fDgdr  q
 t#;r. Since we know the
mapping between D and DC, we can formally de®ne
what it means to solve decision problem D. There
are two computations of interest.
First, we would like to compute the maximum
expected utility. The maximum expected utility,
denoted by u, is given by u  
ft1; . . . ; tmg 


fi1; . . . ; ip; q1; . . . ; qng#;r.
Second, we would like to compute an optimal
strategy r that gives us the maximum expected
utility u. A strategy r of D is optimal if and only
if t
 q#fDgdr  u, where t, q, and D refer to
the equivalent canonical valuation network rep-
resentation DC.
5. A fusion algorithm
In this section, we describe a fusion algorithm
for solving valuation network representations of
decision problems. The fusion algorithm described
here is a slight generalization of the fusion algo-
rithm described in (Shenoy, 1992a). The main
dierence is in the treatment of indicator valua-
tions. Indicator valuations are accounted for ex-
plicitly and through the use of eective frames. All
computations are done on eective frames only.
Computing eective frames: If we treat an indi-
cator valuation as a function whose values are ei-
ther 0 or 1, then marginalization of indicator
valuation (de®ned in Section 3.2) is equivalent to
Boolean addition over the frame of deleted vari-
ables, and combination of indicator valuations
(also de®ned in Section 3.2) is equivalent to
pointwise Boolean multiplication. We have shown
elsewhere (Shenoy, 1994a) that Boolean addition
and Boolean multiplication satisfy the three axi-
oms that allow the use of local computation in
computing marginals (Shenoy and Shafer, 1990).
Thus we can use local computation to compute
eective frames (see Shenoy (1994a) for a fusion
algorithm that can be used for computing eective
frames using local computation). Consider, for
example, the computation of the eective frame
for fR1;R2; Sg. In Section 3.2, we saw that the
eective frame for fR1;R2; Sg is de®ned as
Xi1 
 Xi2 
 Xi4#fR1;R2;Sg. Notice that Xi1 
 Xi2 

Xi4 is an indicator valuation for fT1;R1; T2;R2; Sg,
and in marginalizing the combination to
fR1;R2; Sg, we delete fT1; T2g. Since T2 is only in
the domain of i2, it is easy to show that Xi1 

Xi2 




(A brief explanation is as follows: FusT2fXi1 ;
Xi2;Xi4g  fXi1 ;X#fT1;R2gi2 ;Xi4g, and FusT1fXi1 ;
X#fT1;R2gi2 ;Xi4g  fXi1 
 X#fT1;R2gi2 
#fR1;R2g; Xi4g. The
most expensive combination in Xi1 
 Xi2 

Xi3#fR1;R2;Sg is on the frame for fT1;R1; T2;R2; Sg




 Xi4 is on the frame for








Computation of eective frames is done during
the process of solving valuation networks. It is also
done prior to speci®cation of the numerical details
of the probability and utility valuations. As we saw
earlier, the numerical details of the probability and
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utility valuations are only speci®ed for eective
frames.
Solving valuation networks: We de®ne a fusion
operation that is used to solve a valuation network
representation of a decision problem. The fusion
operation depends on the type of variable being
eliminated. Consider a set of valuations consisting
of j utility valuations, t1; . . . ; tj, s indicator valu-
ations, i1; . . . ; is, and k probability valuations,
q1; . . . ; qk. Suppose ti is a utility valuation for gi, ii
is an indicator valuation for hi, and suppose qi is a
probability valuation for ri. Let FusXft1; . . . ; tj;
i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg denote the collection of valu-
ations after fusing the valuations in the set
ft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg with respect to
variable X. We de®ne FusXft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ;
is; q1; . . . ; qkg in two distinct cases as described
below.
Case 1: Suppose D is a decision variable in
g1 [    [ gj [ h1 [    [ hs [ r1 [    [ rk. Then
FusDft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg is de®ned as
follows:
FusDft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg
 ftijD 62 gig [ ft#gÿfDgg [ fiijD 62hig




ftijD 2 gig; g  [fgijD 2 gig;
q  
fiijD 2 hig 
 
fqijD 2 rig;
r  [fhijD 2 hig [ [frijD 2 rig;
and fD is the indicator valuation representation of
the decision function for D with respect to t.
In this case, after fusion, the set of valuations is
changed as follows. The indicator, utility, and
probability valuations that do not include D in
their domains remain unchanged. All utility valu-
ations that include D in their domain are com-
bined together, and the resulting utility valuation t
is marginalized (using maximization) such that D
is eliminated from its domain. A new indicator
valuation fD corresponding to the decision func-
tion for D is created. All probability and indicator
valuations that include D in their domain are
combined together and the resulting probability
valuation is combined with fD and the result is
marginalized so that D is eliminated from its do-
main.
In Eq. (5.1), since fD is an indicator valuation
representation of the decision function for D, if
g  r, then it is not necessary to either combine fD
or marginalize D out to compute q

fD#r[gÿfDg in Eq. (5.1). From the de®nition of fD
in Eq. (4.6), it follows that
q
 fD#r[gÿfDgc  qc; nDc#gÿfDg
for all c 2 XrÿfDg; 5:2
where nD is the decision function for D with respect
to t. In words, q
 fD#r[gÿfDg is the ``projec-
tion'' of q from r to rÿ{D}.
In Eq. (5.1), if none of the probability and in-
dicator valuations include D in their domains, then
Eq. (5.1) simpli®es as follows:
FusDft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg
 ftijD 62 gig [ t#gÿfDg
 	 [ fi1; . . . ; isg
[ fq1; . . . ; qkg; 5:3
where t and g are as de®ned in Eq. (5.1). In
words, after fusion, the set of valuations is
changed as follows. All utility valuations that
include D in their domain are combined together,
and the resulting utility valuation t is marginali-
zed such that D is eliminated from its domain.
The indicator, utility and probability valuations
that do not include D in their domains remain
unchanged.
Case 2: Suppose R is a chance variable in
g1 . . . [ gj [ h1 [    [ hs [ r1 [    [ rk. In this
case, FusRft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg is de-
®ned as follows:
FusRft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg
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where
t  
ftijR 2 gig; g  [fgijR 2 gig;
q  
fiijR 2 hig 
 
fqijR 2 rig; and
r  [fhijR 2 hig [ [frijR 2 rig:
In this case, after fusion, the set of valuations is
changed as follows. The indicator, utility, and
probability valuations whose domains do not in-
clude R remain unchanged. A new probability
valuation, q#rÿfRg, is created. Finally, we combine
all indicator and probability valuations whose
domains include R, divide the resulting probability
valuation by the new probability valuation that
was created, combine the resulting probability
valuation with the utility valuations whose do-
mains include R, and ®nally marginalize the re-
sulting utility valuation such that R is eliminated
from its domain.
There are several cases in which Eq. (5.4) can
be made computationally more ecient.
Case 2.1: In some instances, q#rÿfRg is a
probability valuation whose values are identically
one. This happens, for example, if R is the only
chance variable in g1 [    [ gj [ h1 [    [ hs[
r1 [    [ rk, or if q is a conditional for R given
rÿ{R}. In such cases, Eq. (5.4) simpli®es to
FusRft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg
 ftijR 62 gig [ ft
 q#g[rÿfRgg [ fiijR 62 hig
[ fqijR 62 rig; 5:5
where t, q, g, and r are as de®ned in Eq. (5.4).
Case 2.2: Suppose none of the utility valuations
include R in their domains. In this case Eq. (5.4)
simpli®es as follows (Shenoy, 1992a):
FusRft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg
 ft1; . . . ; tjg [ fiijR 62 hig [ fqijR 62 rig
[ fq#rÿfRgg; 5:6
where q and r are as de®ned in Eq. (5.4). In words,
after fusion, the set of valuations is changed as
follows. The utility valuations remain unchanged.
The indicator and probability valuations whose
domains do not include R remain unchanged. The
indicator and probability valuations whose do-
mains include R are combined together and the
resulting probability valuation is marginalized
such that R is eliminated from its domain.
Case 2.3: Suppose R is in the domain of all j
utility valuations. In this case, Eq. (5.4) simpli®es
as follows (Shenoy, 1992a):
FusRft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg
 ft
 q#g[rÿfRgg [ fiijR 62 hig [ fqijR 62 rig;
5:7
where t, g, q, and r are as de®ned in Eq. (5.4). In
words, after fusion, the set of valuations is chan-
ged as follows. All utility valuations and those
indicator and probability valuations whose do-
mains include R are combined together, and the
resulting utility valuation is marginalized such that
R is eliminated from its domain. The indicator and
probability valuations whose domains do not in-
clude R remain unchanged.
We are now ready to state the main theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Fusion algorithm). Suppose D 
fXD;XR; fi1; . . . ; ipg; ft1; . . . ; tmg; fq1; . . . ; qng;!g
is a well-de®ned valuation network representation of
a decision problem. Suppose X1X2 . . . Xk is a valid




ft1; . . . ; tmg 
 
fi1; . . . ; ip;
q1; . . . ; qng#;r
 
FusXkf:::FusX2fFusX1ft1; . . . ; tm;
i1; . . . ; ip; q1; . . . ; qngggr:
A proof of this theorem is given in Section 8.
We will illustrate the fusion algorithm using the
UCB problem. Notice that the only valid deletion
sequence is SBR2T2R1T1.
Fusion with respect to S: First we fuse valua-
tions in ft1; t2; t3; i1; i2; r; q1; q2g with respect to S
(see Fig. 6). Since S is a chance variable, we use the
de®nition of fusion in Eq. (5.4), i.e.,
FusSft1; t2; t3; i1; i2; r; q1; q2g
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Let q3 denote r
 q1 




 q2=q3#fR1;R2;Bg. The result of
fusion with respect to S is shown graphically in
Fig. 6. The details of the numerical computation
involved in the fusion operation are shown in
Tables 4 and 5. Notice that the combination and
marginalization operations are done on eective
frames that are computed using the local compu-
tation procedure outlined in Eq. (5.1). Also, the
numerical results shown in Tables 4±8 were done
in a spreadsheet with 32-bit precision, but the re-
sults are only shown after rounding o to two
decimal places.
Fusion with respect to B: Next, we fuse the
valuations in ft1; t2; t4; i1; i2; q3g with respect to B
(see Fig. 6). Since B is a decision variable and there
Fig. 6. Top: original VN; middle: after fusion wrt S; bottom: after fusion wrt B.
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are no probability valuations that include B in
their domains, we use the de®nition of fusion in
Eq. (5.3), i.e.,
FusBft1; t2; t4; i1; i2; q3g
 t1; t2; t#fR1;R2g4 ; i1; i2; q3
n o
:
Let t5 denote t
#fR1;R2g
4 . The result of fusion
with respect to B is shown graphically in Fig. 6.
The computational details of the fusion operation
and the decision function for B are shown in Ta-
ble 6.
Fusion with respect to R2: Next we fuse
ft1; t2; t5; i1; i2; q3g with respect to R2 (see Fig. 7).
Since R2 is a chance variable, we use the de®nition
of fusion in Eq. (5.4), i.e.,
FusR2ft1; t2; t5; i1; i2; q3g




 q3#fT1;R1;T2g#fT1;R1;T2g; i1; i2 
 q3#fT1;R1;T2gg
Let q4 denote i2 
 q3#fT1;R1;T2g and let t6 denote
t5 
 i2 
 q3=q4#fT1;R1;T2g. The result of fusion
with respect to R2 is shown graphically in Fig. 7.
The details of the numerical computation involved
in the fusion operation are shown in Table 7.
Fusion with respect to T2: Next, we fuse
ft1; t2; t6; i1; q4g with respect to T2 (see Fig. 7).
Since T2 is a decision variable, we use the de®ni-
tion of fusion in Eq. (5.1), i.e.,








where fT2 is the decision function for T2. Let t7
denote t2 
 t6#fT1;R1g, and let q5 denote
q4 
 fT 2#fT1;R1g. The result of fusion with respect
to T2 is shown graphically in Fig. 7. The details of
the numerical computation involved in the fusion
operation are shown in Table 7. Notice that we
can use Eq. (5.2) to identify the values of q5 
q4 
 fT 2#fT1;R1g and no computations are neces-
sary for this operation (see Table 7).
Fusion with respect to R1: Next, we fuse
ft1; t7; i1; q5g with respect to R1 (see Fig. 8). Since
R1 is a chance variable, and it is the only chance
variable, we use the de®nition of fusion in
Eq. (5.5), i.e.,







Let t8 denote t7 
 i1 
 q5#T1 . The result of fusion
with respect to R1 is shown in Fig. 8. The details of
the computation involved in the fusion operation
are shown in Table 8.
Fusion with respect to T1: Next we fuse ft1; t8g
with respect to T1 (see Fig. 8). Since T1 is a
Table 4
Details of fusion with respect to S (continued in Table 5)
XfR1 ;R2 ;Sg r q1 q2 r 
 q1 
 q2q q#fR1 ;R2g  q3 q/q3 q0
n1 n2 p 0.80 1 1 0.80 1 0.80
n1 n2 l 0.20 1 1 0.20 0.20
d1 n2 p 0.80 0.10 1 0.08 0.20 0.40
d1 n2 l 0.20 0.60 1 0.12 0.60
d1 d2 p 0.80 0.10 0 0 0.07 0
d1 d2 l 0.20 0.60 0.56 0.07 1
d1  d2 p 0.80 0.10 1 0.08 0.13 0.60
d1  d2 l 0.20 0.60 0.44 0.05 0.40
 d1 n2 p 0.80 0.90 1 0.72 0.80 0.90
 d1 n2 l 0.20 0.40 1 0.08 0.10
 d1 d2 p 0.80 0.90 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.60
 d1 d2 l 0.20 0.40 0.67 0.05 0.40
 d1  d2 p 0.80 0.90 0.89 0.64 0.67 0.96
 d1  d2 l 0.20 0.40 0.33 0.03 0.04
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decision variable, and there are no probability
valuations that bear on T1, we use the de®nition of
fusion in Eq. (5.3), i.e.,






Let t9 denote t1 
 t8#;. The result after fusion
with respect to T1 is shown in Fig. 8. The details of
the computation involved in the fusion operation
are shown in Table 8.
This completes the fusion algorithm. An
optimal strategy can be pieced together from the
Table 5
Details of fusion with respect to S (continued from Table 4)
XfR1 ;R2 ;B;Sg q
0 t3 q0 
 t3 q0 
 t3#fR1 ;R2 ;Bg  t4
n1 n2 b p 0.80 60 48 28
n1 n2 b l 0.20 ÿ100 ÿ20
n1 n2 g p 0.80 20 16 24
n1 n2 g l 0.20 40 8
n1 n2  b p 0.80 0 0 0
n1 n2  b l 0.20 0 0
d1 n2 b p 0.40 60 24 ÿ36
d1 n2 b l 0.60 ÿ100 ÿ60
d1 n2 g p 0.40 20 8 32
d1 n2 g l 0.60 40 24
d1 n2  b p 0.40 0 0 0
d1 n2  b l 0.60 0 0
d1 d2 b p 0 60 0 ÿ100
d1 d2 b l 1 ÿ100 ÿ100
d1 d2 g p 0 20 0 40
d1 d2 g l 1 40 40
d1 d2  b p 0 0 0 0
d1 d2  b l 1 0 0
d1  d2 b p 0.60 60 36 ÿ4
d1  d2 b l 0.40 ÿ100 ÿ40
d1  d2 g p 0.60 20 12 28
d1  d2 g l 0.40 40 16
d1  d2  b p 0.60 0 0 0
d1  d2  b l 0.40 0 0
 d1 n2 b p 0.90 60 54 44
 d1 n2 b l 0.10 ÿ100 ÿ10
 d1 n2 g p 0.90 20 18 22
 d1 n2 g l 0.10 40 4
 d1 n2  b p 0.90 0 0 0
 d1 n2  b l 0.10 0 0
 d1 d2 b p 0.60 60 36 ÿ4
 d1 d2 b l 0.40 ÿ100 ÿ40
 d1 d2 g p 0.60 20 12 28
 d1 d2 g l 0.40 40 16
 d1 d2  b p 0.60 0 0 0
 d1 d2  b l 0.40 0 0
 d1  d2 b p 0.96 60 57.60 53.60
 d1  d2 b l 0.04 ÿ100 ÿ4
 d1  d2 g p 0.96 20 19.20 20.80
 d1  d2 g l 0.04 40 1.60
 d1  d2  b p 0.96 0 0 0
 d1  d2  b l 0.04 0 0
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decision functions nT1 ; nT2 ; nB. An optimal strategy is
do test t2; if the test results from the two subsystems
are either d1; d2 or d1; d2; or  d1; d2, then
buy with guarantee, and if the test results are
 d1; d2, then buy with no guarantee. The ex-
pected utility of the optimal strategy is $32.87.
Table 6
Details of fusion with respect to B
XfR1 ;R2 ;Bg t4 t
#fR1 ;R2g
4  t5 nB
n1 n2 b 28 28 b
n1 n2 g 24
n1 n2  b 0
d1 n2 b ÿ36
d1 n2 g 32 32 g
d1 n2  b 0
d1 d2 b ÿ100
d1 d2 g 40 40 g
d1 d2  b 0
d1  d2 b ÿ4
d1  d2 g 28 28 g
d1  d2  b 0
 d1 n2 b 44 44 b
 d1 n2 g 22
 d1 n2  b 0
 d1 d2 b ÿ4
 d1 d2 g 28 28 g
 d1 d2  b 0
 d1  d2 b 53.60 53.60 b
 d1  d2 g 20.80
 d1  d2  b 0
Table 7
Details of fusion with respect to R2 and T2. q4 denotes i2 
 q3#fT1 ;R1 ;T2g, t6 denotes i2 
 q3=q4 
 t5#fT1 ;R1 ;T2g, t7 denotes
t6 
 t2#fT1 ;R1g, and q5 denotes q4 
 fT2 #fT1 ;R1g
XfT1 ;R1 ;T2 ;R2g i2 






 t5 t6 t2 t6 
 t2 t7 nT2 q5
nt n1 nc n2 1 1 1 28 28 28 0 28 28 nc 1
t1 d1 nc n2 0.20 0.20 1 32 32 32 0 32 32 nc 0.20
t1 d1 nc n2 0.80 0.80 1 44 44 44 0 44 44 nc 0.80
t2 d1 nc d2 0.07 0.20 0.33 40 13.33 32 0 32 32 nc 0.20
t2 d1 nc d2 0.13 0.67 28 18.67
t2 d1 nc d2 0.13 0.80 0.17 28 4.67 49.33 0 49.33 49.33 nc 0.80
t2 d1 nc d2 0.67 0.83 53.60 44.67
t3 d1 s n2 0.20 0.20 1 32 32 32 0 32 32 s 0.20
t3 d1 c d2 0.07 0.20 0.33 40 13.33 32 ÿ4 28
t3 d1 c d2 0.13 0.67 28 18.67
t3 d1 s n2 0.80 0.80 1 44 44 44 0 44
t3 d1 c d2 0.13 0.80 0.17 28 4.67 49.33 ÿ4 45.33 45.33 c 0.80
t3 d1 c d2 0.67 0.83 53.60 44.67
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The fusion algorithm described here is similar
to the message-passing algorithm described by
Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988) in the sense
that our algorithm takes advantage of the condi-
tional independencies in the underlying probability
distribution. The fusion algorithm can be de-
scribed as a message-passing algorithm where the
messages are passed between neighboring nodes in
a join tree (see, e.g., Jensen et al., 1994; Cowell,
1994). However, since in a decision problem we are
only interested in one marginal (for the empty set),
the junction tree data structure does not contribute
much to computational eciency. It does,
however, add some overhead to the computa-
tional cost.
6. Comparison with symmetric valuation network
technique
In this section, we compare the technique pro-
posed here with the symmetric valuation network
technique described in Shenoy (1992a, 1993). This
will explain the contribution and signi®cance of
this work.
The valuation network representation described
in Shenoy (1992a, 1993) is designed for symmetric
decision problems. It includes neither the notion of
indicator valuations nor the related notion of ef-
fective frames. Like the technique described here,
the symmetric valuation network representation
technique makes a problem symmetric by adding
dummy con®gurations to variables. This strategy
enlarges the size of the problem. In the asymmetric
valuation network representation, the enlarged
size is reduced using the notions of indicator val-
uations and eective frames. In comparison, the
symmetric valuation network technique is unable
to reduce the size of the problem, and this results
in a huge computational penalty in solving the
problem.
There is a second more fundamental advantage
of the technique described here for asymmetric
decision problems that is best illustrated by an
example. Fig. 9 shows the symmetric valuation
network for the UCB problem. If we compare this
symmetric valuation network to the asymmetric
valuation network shown in Fig. 3, the dierences
are in the probability valuations. In the symmetric
valuation network, the joint conditional proba-
bility distribution factors into three probability
valuations ± q01, q
0
2, and r ± whereas in the asym-
metric valuation network, the joint probability
distribution factors into ®ve valuations ± three
probability valuations, q1, q2, and r, and two in-
dicator valuations, i1 and i2. The relation between
the two probability models is as follows:
q01  i1 
 q1; and q02  i2 
 q2. Thus we can think
of an indicator valuation as a qualitative factor of
a probability valuation. The factoring of an indi-
cator valuation out of a probability valuation re-
sults in reducing the domain of the resulting
probability valuation. For example, while the do-
main of q02 is fT1;R1; T2;R2; Sg, the domain of q2 is
only fR1;R2; Sg. Thus, in general, the valuations in
an asymmetric valuation network are on smaller
domains than the valuations in symmetric valua-
tion networks. This fact has a severe implication in
the computational cost of solving a problem. For
example, in the UCB problem, if we apply the
fusion algorithm to the symmetric valuation net-
work, since S has to be deleted ®rst and S is in-
Table 8
Details of fusion with respect to R1 and T1
XfT1 ;R1g i1 
 q5  q6 t7 q6 









nt n1 1 28 28 28 0 28
t1 d1 0.20 32 6.40 41.60 ÿ9 32.60
t1  d1 0.80 44 35.20
t2 d1 0.20 32 6.40 45.87 ÿ13 32.87 32.87 t2
t2  d1 0.80 49.33 39.47
t3 d1 0.20 32 6.40 42.67 ÿ10 32.67
t3  d1 0.80 45.33 36.27
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with respect to S is done on the global frame of all
six variables. In comparison, in the asymmetric
valuation network, the fusion with respect to S is
done on the eective frame of only four variables,
namely fR1;R2;B; Sg.
In summary, the asymmetric valuation net-
work representation is more expressive than the
symmetric valuation network representation. The
concept of indicator valuations allows us to rep-
resent structural asymmetry in a decision prob-
lem. Also, the asymmetric valuation network
representation leads to a more ecient solution
for two reasons. First, we do all computations on
eective frames (instead of frames). Second, in
general, the computations are more local because
the probability valuations are on smaller do-
mains.
Fig. 7. Top: the UCB valuation network after fusion with respect to S and B; middle: after fusion with respect to R2; bottom: after
fusion with respect to T2.
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7. Summary and conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is an
augmentation of the valuation network tech-
nique for representing and solving asymmetric
decision problems. The structural asymmetry in
a decision problem is represented by indicator
valuations. An indicator valuation is a special
type of a probability valuation. Indicator valu-
ations allow us to reduce the domain of proba-
bility valuations. This contributes to the
eciency of the solution technique. Also, indi-
cator valuations are used to de®ne eective
frames. An eective frame is a subset of a frame.
All computations are done on eective frames,
and this contributes also to the eciency of the
solution technique.
The fusion algorithm is essentially the same as
in the symmetric case. The main dierence is in
how indicator valuations are handled. Indicator
valuations are treated as probability valuations.
However since indicator valuations are identically
one on eective frames, there are no computa-
tions involved in combining indicator valuations.
This contributes to the eciency of the solution
technique. Indicator valuations do contribute
domain information and cannot be totally ig-
nored.
A disadvantage of our technique is the adding
of dummy con®gurations to variables that
Fig. 8. Left: the VN for the UCB after fusion with respect to S,B,R2 and T2; middle: after fusion with respect to R1; right: after fusion
with respect to T1.
Fig. 9. A symmetric valuation network for the UCB problem.
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increases the computational burden of solving the
problem. If we can ®nd a way of making a prob-
lem symmetric without enlarging the frames of
variables, then our technique can be improved.
One possibility is to adapt Smith, Holtzman and
Matheson's (Smith et al., 1993) sharing method
to valuation networks. This can be done by as-
signing probabilities to subsets of frames as in the
theory of belief functions (Bordley, 1993; Liu and
Shenoy, 1993).
8. Proofs
In this section we give a proof for Theorem 5.1.
First we state and prove a lemma needed to prove
Theorem 5.1.
Lemma 8.1. Suppose D  fXD;XR; fi1; . . . ; isg;
ft1; . . . ; tjg; fq1; . . . ; qkg;!g is a well-de®ned val-
uation network representation of a decision problem.
Suppose X is a minimal variable in X  XD [XR
with respect to the partial order >, where > is the
transitive closure of ®. Then

ft1; . . . ; tjg


fi1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg#XÿfXg
 
FusXft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg:
Proof of Lemma 8.1. We prove this result in two
mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases, each
corresponding to the de®nition of the fusion
operation in Eqs. (5.1) and (5.4), respectively.
Suppose ii is an indicator valuation for hi; ti is a
utility valuation for gi, and qi is a probability
valuation for ri.
Case 1: Suppose X is a decision variable.
Without loss of generality, assume that t1; . . . ; tj
are the only utility valuations that have X in their
domains, and i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qk are the only in-
dicator and probability valuations that have X in
their domains. Let t denote 
 ft1; . . . ; tjg; g
the [ fg1; . . . ; gjg; q the 
 fi1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg,
and r denote [ fh1; . . . ; hs; r1; . . . ; rkg. Suppose
c 2 XXÿfXg. Then

ft1; . . . ; tjg

 
fi1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg#XÿfXgc
MAXft1c#g1ÿfXg; x      tjc#gjÿfXg; x
 tj 1c#gj1      tjc#gj
 i1c#h1ÿfXg; x . . . isc#hsÿfXg; xis 1
c#hs1 . . . isc#hsq1c#r1ÿfXg; x . . .
qkc#rkÿfXg; xqk 1c#rk 1 . . . qkc#rk j
x 2WX 3 c; x 2 XXg:
Since D is a well-de®ned, it can be shown that
i1c#h1ÿfXg; x . . . isc#hsÿfXg; xq1c#r1ÿfXg; x . . .
qkc#rkÿfXg; x
 i1c#h1ÿfXg; y . . . isc#hsÿfXg; y
q1c#r1ÿfXg; y . . . qkc#rkÿfXg; y
for all x; y 2WX 3 c; x; c; y 2 XX
(otherwise one can prove that i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qk
do not satisfy the de®nition of well-de®ned po-
tentials in Eq. (4.10)). Therefore,

ft1; . . . ; tjg

 
fi1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg#XÿfXgc
 MAXft1c#g1ÿfXg;x      tjc#gjÿfXg; xjx
2WX 3 c#gÿfXg; x 2 XXg  tj 1c#gj 1
     tjc#gji1c#h1ÿfXg; x . . . isc#hsÿfXg; x
q1c#r1ÿfXg; x . . . qkc#rkÿfXg; xis 1c#hs 1
. . . isc#hsqk 1c#rk 1 . . . qkc#rk 
 t#gÿfXgc#gÿfXg  tj 1c#gj 1      tjc#gj
i1c#h1ÿfXg; y . . . isc#hsÿfXg; yq1c#r1ÿfXg; y
. . . qkc#rkÿfXg; yis 1c#hs 1
. . . isc#hsqk 1c#rk 1 . . . qkc#rk 
where y  nX c#gÿfXg
 t#gÿX c#gÿfXg  tj 1c#gj 1      tjc#gj
q
 fX #rÿfXgc#rÿfXgis 1c#hs 1 . . . isc#hs
qk 1c#rk 1 . . . qkc#rk 
 
ft#gÿfXg; tj 1; . . . ; tjg
[fq
 fX #rÿfXg; is 1; . . . ; is; qk 1; . . . ; qkgc
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 
FusXft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkgc
(from (5.1)).
Case 2: Suppose X is a random variable.
Without loss of generality, assume that t1; . . . ; tj
are the only utility valuations that have X in their
domains, and i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qk are the only in-
dicator and probability valuations that have X in
their domains. Let t denote 
 ft1; . . . ; tjg; g [
fg1; . . . ; gjg; q 
 fi1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkg; and r
denote [ fh1; . . . ; hs; r1; . . . ; rkg. Suppose c 2
XXÿfXg. Then

ft1; . . . ; tjg


fi1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ;qg#XÿfXgc

X
t1c#g1ÿfXg; x    
 tjc#gjÿfXg; x  tj 1c#gj 1      tjc#gj
i1c#h1ÿfXg; x . . . isc#hsÿfXg; xis 1c#hs 1
. . . isc#hsq1c#r1ÿfXg; x . . . qkc#rkÿfXg; x





 tj 1c#gj 1
     tjc#gjqc#rÿfXg; xjx 2WX 3
c;x 2 XXg

is 1c#hs 1 . . . isc#hs






     tjc#hjqc#rÿfXg; x=q#rÿfXg
c#rÿfXgjx 2WX 3 c; x 2 XXg

is 1






 tj 1c#gj 1      tjc#gj
q=q#rÿfXgc#rÿfXg; xjx 2WX 3
c;x 2 XXg

is 1c#hs 1 . . .






x 2 WX 3 c; x 2 XXg

 tj 1c#gj 1      tjc#gjX
fq=q#rÿfXgc#rÿfXg; xjx 2WX 3

c; x 2 XXg

is 1c#hs 1 . . . isc#hsqk 1
c#rk 1 . . . qkc#rk q#rÿfXgc#rÿfXg
 t
 q=q#rÿfXg#g[rÿfXgc#g[rÿfXg
tj 1c#gj 1      tjc#gjis 1c#hs 1 . . . isc#hs
qk 1c#rk 1 . . . qkc#rk q#rÿfXgc#rÿfXg
 
 ft
 q=q#rÿfXg#g[rÿfXg; tj 1; . . . ; tjg
[ fis 1; . . . ; is; qk 1; . . . ; qk; q#rÿfXggc
 
 FusXft1; . . . ; tj; i1; . . . ; is; q1; . . . ; qkgc
(from (5.4)).
We have now shown the result for both cases.
Therefore the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By de®nition,

ft1; . . . ; tmg 
 
fi1; . . . ; ip;q1; . . . ; qng#; is
obtained by sequentially marginalizing a minimal
variable. A proof of this theorem is obtained by
repeatedly applying the result of Lemma 8.1. At
each step, we delete a minimal variable and fuse
the set of all valuations with respect to the minimal
variable. It is easy to show that after fusion, the
resulting valuation network is well-de®ned. Using
Lemma 8.1, after fusion with respect to X1, the
combination of all valuations in the resulting
valuation network is equal to 
ft1; . . . ; tmg 


fi1; . . . ; ip; q1; . . . ; qng#XÿfX1g. Again, using
Lemma 8.1, after fusion with respect to X2, the
combination of all valuations in the resulting VBS
is equal to 
ft1; . . . ; tmg 
 
fi1; . . . ; ip;
q1; . . . ; qng#XÿfX1;X2g and so on. When all the
variables have been deleted, there will be a
single valuation left. Using Lemma 8.1, this
valuation will be 
ft1; . . . ; tmg 
 
fi1; . . . ; ip;
q1; . . . ; qng#;.
606 P.P. Shenoy / European Journal of Operational Research 121 (2000) 579±608
Acknowledgements
This work is based upon work supported in
part by the National Science Foundation under
Grant No. SES-9213558. I am grateful to Rui
Guo, Diane Lander, Liping Liu, Concha Bielza,
Hong Xu, and Riza Demirer for comments and
discussions. Comments and questions from Con-
cha Bielza have resulted in elimination of several
errors in previous drafts of this paper. The paper
has bene®ted immensely from the comments of
two anonymous referees on an earlier draft of this
paper.
References
Bielza, C., Shenoy, P.P., 1996. A comparison of graphical
techniques for asymmetric decision problems. Working
paper no. 271, School of Business, University of Kansas,
Lawrence, KS. Available by ftp from <ftp.bschool.uk-
ans.edu/home/pshenoy/wp271.pdf>.
Bordley, R.F., 1993. Modelling unforeseen events with similar-
ity templates: When Bayesian probabilities resemble Sha-
fer's probabilities. Unpublished manuscript. Operating
Sciences Department, General Motors Research Labs,
Warren, MI.
Call, H.J., Miller, W.A., 1990. A comparison of approaches and
implementations for automating decision analysis. Reliabil-
ity Engineering and System Safety 30, 115±162.
Covaliu, Z., Oliver, R.M., 1995. Representation and solution of
decision problems using sequential decision diagrams.
Management Science 41 (12), 1860±1881.
Cowell, R.G., 1994. Decision networks: A new formulation for
multistage decision problems. Research report no. 132,
University College London, UK.
Ezawa, K.J., 1986. Ecient evaluation of in¯uence diagrams.
Ph.D. thesis, Department of Engineering±Economic Sys-
tems, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Fung, R.M., Shachter, R.D., 1990. Contingent
in¯uence diagrams. Working paper, Department of
Engineering±Economic Systems, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA.
Howard, R.A., 1962. The used car buyer. In: Howard, R.A.
Matheson J.E. (Eds.), The Principles and Applications of
Decision Analysis, vol. 2. Strategic Decisions Group, Menlo
Park, CA, pp. 719±62 (1984).
Howard, R.A., 1990. From in¯uence to relevance to know-
ledge. In Oliver, R.M., Smith, J.Q. (Eds.), In¯uence
Diagrams, Belief Nets and Decision Analysis. Wiley,
Chichester, pp. 3±23.
Howard, R.A., Matheson, J.E., 1981. In¯uence diagrams. In:
Howard R.A., Matheson, J.E. (Eds.), 1984. The Principles
and Applications of Decision Analysis, vol. 2. Strategic
Decisions Group, Menlo Park, CA, pp. 719±762.
Jensen, F., Jensen, F.V., Dittmer, S.L., 1994. From in¯uence
diagrams to junction trees. In: Mantaras, R.L., Poole, D.
(Eds.), Uncertainty in Arti®cial Intelligence: Proceedings of
the 10th Conference, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA,
pp. 367±373.
Kirkwood, C.W., 1993. An algebraic approach to formulating
and solving large models for sequential decisions under
uncertainty. Management Science 39 (7), 900±913.
Lauritzen, S.L., Spiegelhalter, D.J., 1988. Local computations
with probabilities on graphical structures and their appli-
cation to expert systems (with discussion). Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Series B 50 (2), 157±224.
Liu, L., Shenoy, P.P., 1993. Belief potential networks for
asymmetric decision problems. Working paper no. 256,
School of Business, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.
Miller III, A.C., Merkhofer, M.W., Howard, R.A., Matheson,
J.E., Rice, T.R., 1976. Development of decision aids for
decision analysis. Final technical report DO # 27742
Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, CA.
Ndilikilikesha, P.C., 1992. A study of in¯uence diagrams and
their generalizations. Ph.D. thesis, School of Business,
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.
Ndilikilikesha, P.C., 1994. Potential in¯uence diagrams. Inter-
national Journal of Approximate Reasoning 10 (3), 251±
285.
Olmsted, S.M., 1983. On representing and solving decision
problems. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Engineering±Eco-
nomic Systems, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Raia, H., Schlaifer, R.O., 1961. Applied Statistical Decision
Theory, Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA.
Shachter, R.D., 1986. Evaluating in¯uence diagrams. Opera-
tions Research 34 (6), 871±882.
Shafer, G., 1976. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Shenoy, P.P., 1992a. Valuation-based systems for Bayesian
decision analysis. Operations Research 40 (3), 463±484.
Shenoy, P.P., 1992b. Valuation-based systems: A framework
for managing uncertainty in expert systems. In: Zadeh,
L.A., Kacprzyk, J. (Eds.), Fuzzy Logic for the Management
of Uncertainty. Wiley, New York, pp. 83±104.
Shenoy, P.P., 1993. A new method for representing and solving
Bayesian decision problems. In: Hand, D.J. (Ed.), Arti®cial
Intelligence Frontiers in Statistics: AI and Statistics III.
Chapman and Hall, London, pp. 119±138.
Shenoy, P.P., 1994a. Consistency in valuation-based systems.
ORSA Journal on Computing 6 (3), 281±291.
Shenoy, P.P., 1994b. A comparison of graphical techniques for
decision analysis. European Journal of Operational Re-
search 78 (1), 1±21.
Shenoy, P.P., 1998. Game trees for decision analysis. Theory
and Decision 44, 149±171.
Shenoy, P.P., Shafer, G., 1990. Axioms for probability and
belief-function propagation. In: Shachter, R.D., Levitt,
T.S., Lemmer, J.F., Kanal, L.N. (Eds.), Uncertainty in
Arti®cial Intelligence, vol. 4. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
P.P. Shenoy / European Journal of Operational Research 121 (2000) 579±608 607
pp. 169±98 Reprinted by Shafer, G., Pearl, J. (Eds.) 1990.
Readings in Uncertain Reasoning, vol. 4. Morgan Kaufm-
ann, San Mateo, CA, pp. 575±610.
Smith, J.E., Holtzman, S., Matheson, J.E., 1993. Structuring
conditional relationships in in¯uence diagrams. Operations
Research 41 (2), 280±297.
Tatman, J.A., 1986. Decision processes in in¯uence diagrams:
Formulation and analysis. Ph.D. thesis, Department of
Engineering±Economic Systems, Stanford University, Stan-
ford, CA.
von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O., 1944. Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior, 1st ed. (2nd ed. 1947, 3rd ed.
1953). Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
608 P.P. Shenoy / European Journal of Operational Research 121 (2000) 579±608
